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Summary
Trade liberalization offers long-term economic benefits, but trade agreements can entail difficult adjustments for some firms and workers. To aid this transition process, some governments offer trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs -for instance, by providing affected workers temporary income replacement and subsidies for retraining or relocation. Advocates argue that such assistance helps compensate those harmed for their losses, redirect economic activity toward more productive uses and enhance the political viability of trade liberalization.
Canada's last formal TAA program was eliminated in the 1980s, but some of its major trading partners, including the United States and the European Union, have dedicated TAA programs.
As Canada seeks to implement two major trade deals -the Canada-EU Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership -the issue of whether and how to design compensation and adjustment packages has moved front and centre. Because trade agreements increasingly require a broad Canadian political consensus on negotiating positions across a range of issues that cover both federal and provincial jurisdictions, new policy approaches might be required, perhaps including trade adjustment assistance.
Based on a thorough review of the evidence and interviews with several provincial trade negotiators, Dmitry Lysenko and Saul Schwartz conclude, however, that Canada does not need a new, stand-alone TAA program, because ➤ such programs have not been particularly effective in encouraging economic adjustment (though they seem to have played a compensatory role);
➤ determining eligibility is arbitrary in practice since it requires judgments about which jobs or firms are negatively affected by a specific trade deal;
➤ future trade agreements are unlikely to lead to severe labour market dislocation -for instance, liberalization of highly sensitive sectors is typically only partial and spread over long phase-in periods; and ➤ a broad-based TAA program is not needed to overcome political opposition to trade agreements, since the federal government has addressed concerns about specific trade deals using ad hoc promises of TAA-like compensation.
However, although the current policy approach has secured political buy-in, the authors identify a critical shortcoming: by rewarding the most critical and vocal stakeholders, trade-related compensation decisions are based largely on political, not necessarily economic, considerations. This means that one-off assistance for one stakeholder leads others to demand similar treatment.
The authors argue that a better way forward for the new Liberal government would be to adopt a more comprehensive policy approach to enhance the adaptability of Canada's economy. The ultimate goal should be to help workers adjust to important longer-run structural changes in the labour market -whether caused by specific trade agreements, technological change, strong economic growth in emerging economies or other factors.
Résumé
La libéralisation des échanges procure des avantages économiques à long terme, mais les accords com- ➤ ces programmes ont été relativement inefficaces en matière d'ajustement économique (même s'ils semblent avoir joué un rôle compensatoire) ;
➤ leurs critères d'admissibilité sont arbitraires puisqu'ils reposent sur une évaluation partiale des entreprises et des emplois qui seront négativement touchés par un accord donné ;
➤ les futurs accords ne devraient pas perturber sérieusement le marché du travail, notamment parce que la libéralisation dans des secteurs sensibles est souvent partielle et s'étend sur de longues périodes ;
➤ il n'est pas nécessaire de créer un PAAC à grande échelle pour surmonter l'opposition politique aux accords commerciaux, puisque Ottawa a promis des mesures compensatoires adaptées à chaque entente.
Mais si l'approche actuelle fait politiquement consensus, les auteurs jugent qu'elle souffre d'une importante lacune : en dédommageant les intervenants les plus critiques et les plus influents, les mesures compensatoires sont souvent décidées en fonction de motifs politiques plutôt qu'économiques.
Ainsi, l'aide ponctuelle offerte à l'un peut en inciter d'autres à réclamer le même traitement.
Pour accroître l'adaptabilité de l'économie canadienne, estiment les auteurs, le nouveau gouvernement libéral serait mieux avisé d'adopter une approche globale. Elle permettrait d'aider les travailleurs à s'adapter aux importants changements structurels qui modifieront à long terme le marché du travail, que ces changements soient provoqués par des accords commerciaux, de nouvelles technologies, une forte croissance économique dans les pays émergents ou d'autres facteurs. Although it is widely recognized that greater international trade brings net benefits over the long term, there are always concerns about the potential effects on specific groups of firms and their employees. Those effects can be the result of stronger import competition caused by specific provisions in a trade agreement (such as lower tariffs) or other factors such as rapid economic growth in emerging economies. For example, CETA has caused concern because of the potential for the expanded import quota for European cheese to hurt Canadian cheesemakers (Grant 2013 ) and because enhanced intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector might hurt generic pharmaceutical companies in Canada (Lexchin and Gagnon 2013) . The TPP also involves some contentious trade concessions in supply-managed agricultural sectors as well as automobiles (Keenan 2015; McGregor 2015) .
Theoretical trade models suggest that, for countries to benefit from trade liberalization, labour and capital must move between and within sectors of the economy. Some industries and firms will expand and others contract. The transition process for the economy entails adjustment costs and takes time. Workers, for example, might lose their jobs and be unable to find new ones quickly. Firms might lose market share to competitors that use more advanced and efficient production processes. Some communities might even face catastrophic economic decline if an industry that is the backbone of the local economy loses its market. And although some effects of trade liberalization are temporary, others can be permanent, with some firms and workers experiencing lower incomes not only during the transition period but on a long-term basis.
Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) is government-provided aid to those negatively affected by import competition -be they workers, firms, sectors, regions or communities (Francois, Jansen and Peters 2011; World Trade Organization 2008) . Historically, TAA programs were narrowly defined and addressed increased import competition caused by specific trade agreements negotiated by governments. Over time, however, some programs have been expanded to help firms or workers deal with increased import competition without attempting to sort out its causes.
Different countries have had various forms of TAA at different times, but the main focus has been on support for workers in the form of temporary income replacement and subsidies for retraining or relocation. Aid for firms has been less extensive, typically taking the form of government loan guarantees, government loans or technical assistance, all intended to help firms compete against new rivals. issues under provincial jurisdiction, and the provinces were involved in the negotiation process to a far greater extent than in previous trade agreements. We argue that CETA has demonstrated that the federal government views compensatory transfers to the provinces as a way to reach federal-provincial consensus. In late 2013, for example, Newfoundland and Labrador was promised up to $280 million from the federal government in return for the province's commitment to remove its minimum processing rules in the fish industry, as required by the EU in the CETA negotiations. Furthermore, since the agreement's stronger intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals likely will increase the cost of provincial drug plans, the federal government has agreed to provide compensation to provincial governments. Indeed, Ontario has already said it would seek compensation for any negative effects of CETA, particularly on drug costs, cheesemakers, winemakers and distilleries. 4 Provincial requests for compensation are likely to continue as Canada negotiates "new-generation" FTAs that include provisions to increase regulatory cooperation among the FTA partners. Many of these "behind-the-border" issues are under provincial jurisdiction, and therefore can be blocked by provincial legislators. This new development adds to provincial bargaining power in seeking compensation.
Another reason to re-examine the need for TAA programs is that Canada is experiencing greater international pressure from its FTA partners to liberalize its supply-managed products (Grant et al. 2014) . Canadian producers of these products -eggs, poultry and dairy -are highly protected from international competition by means of tariff rate quotas, 5 and benefit from government regulation of domestic supply. CETA expanded the quota on imports of cheese from the EU, and thus created an important precedent for reducing the protection of supply-managed products.
Canada then took another step toward opening the supply-managed sector in the TPP by allowing duty-free access to 3.25 percent of its dairy market and somewhat smaller percentages of other supply-managed products (Yakabuski 2015) . In general, because supply-managed products are highly protected, trade liberalization in this area might imply substantial adjustment costs (relative to the size of the sectors). Trade adjustment assistance could provide temporary relief, helping some firms or farmers survive import competition and become internationally competitive. At a minimum, it could provide some compensation to those who cannot adjust.
To preview our conclusions, we do not think that Canada needs a special TAA program for workers and firms affected by recent trade agreements. None of the potential roles of TAA -whether compensatory, efficiency enhancing or political -seems to us to be important in the current Canadian context. In particular, the recent experiences in the CETA and TPP negotiations suggest that a broad-based TAA program is not necessary to overcome political opposition to trade agreements. Such agreements are no longer as controversial among firms and workers as they once were; current debates are certainly less heated than those about the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in the late 1980s. Debates now centre instead on specific sectors, and the federal government has tried to address these issues with ad hoc promises of TAA-like compensation.
Thus far, this seems to have been an acceptable solution to the provinces and affected industries, including producers in supply-managed sectors. (Robertson and Grey 1985, 188) .
Like the programs that came later, the TAB program was neither particularly costly for the federal government nor particularly generous to displaced workers. Its most important limitation was the provision that workers who were eligible for the supplementary unemployment benefits (SUB) programs that the unions had already established with the Big Three automakers would not be eligible for TAB unless their employer agreed to pay into a government fund an amount equal to what they would have paid from their own SUB funds. The employer could opt out of that requirement, but its displaced workers would then be ineligible for TAB. In effect, TAB would work only as a minor top-up to SUB. Moreover, TAB was not to be paid in addition to the workers' unemployment insurance benefits. None of the Big Three automakers agreed to pay into the government fund, however, so their workers were not eligible for TAB, leaving only those workers displaced from firms not covered by the SUB programs eligible for the program.
The TAB program offered a benefit equal to 62 percent of the eligible worker's take-home pay, plus an additional 2.5 percentage points for each of the worker's dependents, up to a maximum of about $75 per week ($560 per week in 2014 dollars), an amount only slightly higher than SUB benefits. TAB was normally available for only one year after layoff and after UI was exhausted. Requiring SUB and UI to be "used up" before TAB was paid limited government expenditures on the program so much that, "by the end of the year, with over 3,000 workers out of work because of the agreement, the government had paid out a grand total of $4,559 on the TAB" (Anastakis 2005, 116) . However, the path that was chosen in the early years of the Auto Pact became the starting point for subsequent TAA programs for workers.
Programs for workers in the 1970s
Canada's participation, in the late 1960s, in multilateral trade negotiations led to greater access to foreign markets for Canadian exporters and greater import competition for domestic Canadian firms. Apart from the effects of the trade negotiations, several industries -clothing, textiles and footwear foremost among them -were under pressure from low-cost foreign producers whose more modern factories and lower labour costs enabled them to undercut domestic prices even with import tariffs in place (Mahon 1984; Pestieau 1976) . The need for measures to safeguard domestic production is a concern for all countries engaged in trade liberalization. Because a large proportion of Canadian production was destined for export, the opening of foreign markets to those exports was clearly a high priority for the federal government, but making provisions for the severe dislocation that some industries might experience was also deemed important.
The Adjustment Assistance Program, in place between 1971 and 1982, was a TAA program primarily for textile workers. The program was largely compensatory in nature; provisions for training or relocation were virtually nonexistent (Pestieau 1976) . Workers who had been permanently laid off could apply to the Textile and Clothing Board, an agency set up to deal with issues in that sector. If the Board determined that the layoff was trade related, workers who were under 55 years of age were eligible for supplementary unemployment benefits. These benefits were designed to disappear when an anticipated increase in the generosity of UI came into effect. Workers who were over 55 were eligible for a preretirement benefit after they had exhausted their UI claim, though few made use of this part of the program.
Programs for older workers in the 1980s
Targeted support for the most vulnerable trade-affected workers continued into the 1980s. Support was expanded through the 1982 Labour Adjustment Benefits (LAB) program. The program covered only older and more vulnerable workers -those between the ages of 54 and 65 who had "no present prospect of employment" or who had accepted employment with relatively low earnings -and provided them preretirement benefits (Labour Canada 1990, 4) . In addition, an important change in the certification process made it easier to investigate the effects of import competition. Whereas the programs in the 1970s had certified employees if the particular firm for which they were working was being damaged by import competition, the LAB designation process looked at whether import competition was causing damage to industries, rather than to individual firms.
The only Canada-wide designations were given to the textile, clothing, footwear and tanning industries. These designations subsumed the TAA programs, such as the Adjustment Assistance
Program, that were active in these industries in the 1970s. The remaining designations were given to various industries in specific regions. During the period that the program existed (1982-90), about 23,000 workers' claims were approved. The total expenditure of the program over that period was about $600 million, or between $970 million and $1.4 billion in today's prices (Labour Canada 1990) . 6 These numbers indicate there was demand for these programs, albeit within narrowly defined groups of workers. By 1988, however, all designations of industries had expired and no new ones had been made. Further, the LAB was replaced by the Program for Older Worker Adjustment, under which workers could obtain benefits regardless of the reasons for their job loss.
That was the end of trade adjustment assistance for workers in Canada.
Programs for firms
In the mid-1960s, parallel to TAA for workers, Canada introduced the Automotive Manufacturing Assistance Regulations, a program for firms hurt by the Auto Pact (Canada 2015a) . A firm in the auto sector was eligible for loans if its production was, or threatened to be, reduced because of If it were impossible to determine accurately whether a particular job loss should qualify for the assistance, any "arbitrary rules" aimed to produce "rough justice"
would be unfair and discriminatory (xvii). The council, like the Macdonald Commission, therefore recommended adjustment programs to help workers who had been harmed for any reason, not just for trade-related reasons.
These experiences raise the question of why the evolution of TAA programs in Canada differed so much from similar programs in the United States, which not only survived but thrived. One study (Lysenko 2013) attributes that difference to the need for the US president to get authority from Congress to bring new trade agreements into force with less difficulty. Trade adjustment assistance apparently was part of the price Congress exacted. costs, however, fully compensating displaced workers is extremely difficult.
Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance?
The second benchmark is the situation after the liberalization of trade. From this perspective, TAA-as-adjustment might be deemed successful if the postliberalization earnings of assisted workers are higher than they would have been had the program not existed. TAA-as-compensation is always successful from this perspective because unemployed workers would have received no compensation had the program not existed. In any case, supporters of trade liberalization might deem a TAA program a success, regardless of its economic impact on workers or firms, if it helped win the political battle to liberalize trade.
As we discuss later, displaced workers generally suffer permanent losses as the result of their displacement -whatever the cause -even if they find new jobs. In attempting to reduce these losses, training programs offer displaced workers a chance to acquire new skills and, it is hoped, new, well-paying jobs. Because training is an important component of trade adjustment assistance, we start by looking at the overall effectiveness of training for displaced workers.
The effectiveness of training displaced workers
The evidence on the effectiveness of training programs for displaced workers is mixed. One factor that seems to influence its effectiveness is the duration of training. A review by Frenette, Upward and Wright (2011) generally shows the ineffectiveness of short-term training provided by US TAA programs. 9 In contrast, the authors find substantial benefits from longer-term training in Canada:
displaced workers who attended post-secondary institutions had annual earnings about $7,000 higher in their new jobs than those who did not attend such institutions. Jacobson, LaLonde and
Sullivan (2005) report a similar positive result on the effect of college training on earnings of displaced workers in the United States; they also show that the nature of the training is important, with more technical programs of study bringing larger returns to workers.
Unfortunately, studies that focus on longer-term training are rare, and only more research would allow more definite conclusions. That said, there are also uncertainties about the supposedly negative effects of short-term training, one of which is that such training might bring larger benefits over the longer term. For example, Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) conclude that classroom and on-the-job training have positive effects in the medium term even though their short-term effects are insignificant or negative.
TAA in the US

TAA for workers
The largest and most recent evaluation of a TAA program for workers is that conducted by Scho- Credit, which refunds 65 percent of health insurance costs and various relocation and job search Although the TAA program has a number of postliberalization goals, the most important is to increase the employment and earnings of participants above what they would have been had the program not existed. The primary mechanism through which higher employment and earnings are intended to be realized is enhanced education and training. Over the four years of the follow-up period, about two-thirds (66 percent) of TAA participants, but only 27 percent of the comparison group, received some form of occupational skills training. Over that same period, TAA participants spent an average of 49 weeks in training, while the comparison group spent only 6 weeks in training. The quarterly effects on training were greatest in the initial two follow-up years, but persisted to some extent throughout the four-year follow-up period.
Because of the focus on training, the researchers expected that the employment and earnings of TAA participants would be lower while they were in training, but would then catch up and exceed the comparison group later in the follow-up period. The dip in employment and earnings occurred as expected, but the recovery did not -at least not during the four-year follow-up period. By the end of that period, the TAA participants were working as much as the comparison group, but their earnings in the final follow-up year were a statistically significant and economically important US$3,300 less than those of the comparison group. A caveat to this largely discouraging result is that the recession of 2008-09 likely had important effect -some of those who were in training during the four-year follow-up period were re-entering the job market at a time of high unemployment, while their matched comparison group members were more likely to have gone back to work before the recession.
Given the mixed results in the literature on the effectiveness of training in general and this dis- for a period after unemployment insurance benefits are exhausted, wage insurance and a health insurance tax credit. These measures definitely make workers better off than would be the case if workers who lost their jobs got no compensation, so although the program might not be successful from the perspective of efficient adjustment, it at least plays a compensatory role.
Third, it is difficult to evaluate the program's ability to secure political support for trade liberalization.
Kletzer and Rosen argue that political support for trade adjustment assistance was weak, with unions referring to the TAA program as "burial insurance" (2005, 318) because it focuses on those who lose jobs and provides them with only modest assistance. Unions worried that their support for TAA would undermine their position against trade liberalization, a concern shared by some congressional Democrats. At that time, only a small group of Democrats in Congress favoured trade liberalization and thought that adjustment assistance was necessary to move forward on it. Congressional Republicans, in contrast, tended to express strong support for trade liberalization, and considered TAA as a "side payment" that they wanted to minimize (Kletzer and Rosen 2005, 318 ).
14 Moreover, any overall assessment of trade adjustment assistance should also cover the process of its delivery. Most relevant to the question of whether Canada needs such assistance is the challenging issue of which displaced workers should be eligible. Over time, the eligibility requirements of the US program have been broadened to reflect the increasing integration of the US economy into the global economy and the increasing variety of channels through which workers are affected by trade. 15 The conventional TAA eligibility criterion for workers is that their employer is hurt by increased imports of products that are similar to its output. But because many firms increasingly are organized into supply chains and participate in only a specific stage of production, rather than producing finished products, the United States TAA program now covers those who work for suppliers of intermediate inputs to directly affected firms or for firms that source their inputs from directly affected firms. Although it is always problematic, determining TAA eligibility is now more complicated as businesses increasingly become organized into complex and geographically dispersed production networks.
To summarize, trade adjustment assistance for workers in the United States has not been particularly effective as an adjustment program or as a program that mitigates political conflict, but it does seem to play a compensatory role.
TAA for firms
Another important TAA program in the United States provides aid to trade-affected firms. The program began by providing loans and loan guarantees, but, since 1986, it has focused only Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance?
on technical assistance. In 1970s, it had become clear that firms were not using the financial assistance they received through the TAA program to become more competitive but as income support (for example, to pay late bills), and therefore the assistance was not contributing to the firms' long-term viability (United States 1979). In the current program, a number of TAA centres help firms design customized projects to recover from harm caused by import competition. The projects may touch on various operational areas, including marketing, management, engineering and information technology systems. Implementing these projects is partially financed by the TAA centres, with the restriction that the funds can only be used to hire third-party consult- With those caveats in mind, the GHK evaluation finds a great deal of heterogeneity in the re-employment rate of participating workers: in some projects, it is abysmally low, while in others it is above the national average of the particular EU member state. As well, the delay between the application for a project and its approval is very long -for instance, in 2014, a
Romanian project was approved two years after the application was submitted (Anyfantis 2014 
Federal-Provincial Relations in Trade Negotiations
T he need to achieve federal-provincial consensus during trade negotiations is a key reasonalbeit a political one -why Canada might need to implement trade adjustment assistance once again. Because the role of the provinces has steadily increased in Canadian trade policy-making in recent decades, it is useful to review the literature on the provincial role in FTA negotiations, and especially in the CETA negotiations. 19 We supplement that discussion by reporting the views of five provincial negotiators who were directly involved in the recent negotiations and whom we interviewed in summer 2014.
The legal framework for international trade agreements
In Canada, the authority to negotiate, sign and ratify international trade agreements belongs to the executive branch, with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) playing a key role (Barnett 2012) . Before a trade agreement is ratified, Parliament must adopt the legislation required for its implementation. Upon ratification, Canada is bound by the agreement and, in most cases, once countries have exchanged the ratification instruments, the agreement is in force and the federal government is responsible for compliance. Nonetheless, legislation adopted by Parliament cannot intrude in areas of provincial jurisdiction, and only 
The role of the provinces during the CETA negotiations
As a number of authors have discussed, 21 during the CETA negotiations, much greater provincial involvement was necessary than before because of the broad nature of the negotiations. Moreover, the EU demanded, from the beginning, that the provinces be closely involved in the negotiations (Panetta 2013) .The greater provincial role was also influenced, according to one of our interviewees, by the early involvement of Jean Charest, Quebec's premier at the onset of the negotiations.
At an early stage, the provinces and the federal government agreed on a list of issues that required provincial participation at the negotiation table and issues that were within the federal Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance?
realm only. The delineation of issues was made early on, and was not controversial. For issues that primarily involved provincial jurisdiction, provincial negotiators were able to be "at the table," meaning that they were in the room but did not actually engage in the direct negotiations. Federal negotiators briefed the provincial officials on a daily basis on issues discussed when not all provincial negotiators were in the room. All of our interviewees felt that the ability to observe and to be briefed daily greatly facilitated their understanding of the issues and their ability to contribute to the quality of the eventual agreement. 22 Throughout the process, the provinces and the federal government actively exchanged negotiating positions, consulting with each other bilaterally and multilaterally and discussing situations as they arose. Quebec alone submitted around 140 position papers, covering a wide range of issues, to the federal government. Provinces could express their positions to the federal government on any issue under negotiation, not only on those that were of direct interest to them.
Our interviewees demonstrated a general consensus that federal-provincial relations during the CETA negotiations were generally cooperative, with provincial concerns taken into account and addressed. As one trade negotiator told us, "The relationship between the federal government and provinces and territories in trade policy is evolving. In CETA, the federal government has sought agreement on issues of provincial jurisdiction, but there is a recognition that for all jurisdictions there will be tradeoffs, and opposition to any one proposal has to be measured in the context of an overall agreement. On those occasions, when a province has been clear in opposition to a position and the federal government persuaded that they would not accept the obligations in a CETA with the inclusion of that position, it has been changed." An exception to this generally cooperative relationship, however, was the situation, discussed in greater detail below, involving the minimum processing rules that Newfoundland and Labrador was asked to
give up in exchange for cuts in EU tariffs on Canadian fishery products.
Thus, the role of the provinces differed from what it had been before CETA. Being at the negotiation table, being debriefed daily, communicating negotiation positions and finding compromises with the federal government brought the provinces deeper into the negotiations. 23 Now, as
Canada negotiates a series of new FTAs that likely will cover issues under provincial jurisdiction, our interviewees generally agreed that the provinces are willing to continue contributing to these negotiations, especially now that they have acquired significant expertise -although, as one provincial trade official put it, that expertise remains underused by the federal government.
Provincial compensation for CETA
TAA programs were not a central focus of the provinces in the CETA negotiations. Generally, provincial governments viewed a trade agreement between Canada and the EU as a desirable development. Therefore, the focus of provincial government adjustment efforts, to the extent that they existed, was on trade facilitation, the creation of infrastructure and support for businesses seeking to expand their trade with the EU.
At the same time, in the case of CETA, some areas were of particular concern to the provinces, and there was a sense that some form of assistance would be needed to counterbalance concessions made in those areas. However, the number of such areas was limited, and in the end,
the federal government made commitments of assistance in only three cases -cheese imports, pharmaceutical patent rights and the Newfoundland and Labrador fish fund. There was no sense, however, at least among those we talked to, that the desire to help affected workers or firms was the major rationale for these offers of assistance. Instead, they thought that each of the three cases was motivated by a unique set of concerns. In each case, the federal government proposed compensation to provinces to reach an agreement in a number of sensitive areas, which, in turn, would allow the overall deal to be reached.
Newfoundland and Labrador and the minimum processing requirements
Paradoxically, at least from an economic perspective, one of the three cases of compensation in Establishing a $400-million fund to help an industry adjust to a change in regulations that would affect just $117 million of its annual exports cannot be justified in economic terms. Instead, the fishing industry fund is better understood in terms of a negotiating strategy. As one of our interviewees claimed, Newfoundland and Labrador's tactic was to extract every possible Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance? benefit from the federal government, and establishing the fishing fund demonstrated its success. Indeed, Premier Kathy Dunderdale later claimed: "We have levered everything we could possibly bring to the table to maximize benefits for the people of the province and we've done that, I think, in spades" (Bailey 2013) . In late 2014, controversy erupted when the federal government seemed to renege on promises made in the ministerial letters, asserting that the fund could be used only to compensate for "demonstrable harm" as the result of the removal of the MPRs. As of this writing, the controversy is unresolved, and Newfoundland and Labrador has said it will not remove the MPRs.
28
Patented drugs
CETA extends the rights of companies that manufacture patented drugs in ways that lengthen the period before generic producers of the patented drugs can enter the market. Lexchin and Gagnon (2014) delineate three ways in which CETA will further protect patented drugs: (1) providing extended patent protection; (2) lengthening the period before generic manufacturers can use data generated by the patented drugmakers to seek approval for generic equivalents; and (3) expanding the rights of patented drugmakers to appeal a decision by Health Canada to allow the entry of a generic equivalent. As a result, the cost to provinces of patented drugs provided to patients covered under provincial health plans will likely increase, as will the cost to patients whose drug needs are not paid by a provincial health plan.
29
According to our interviewees, the provinces requested compensation for these increased costs during the CETA negotiations, with some provinces, including Quebec, writing formal letters.
The federal government agreed to provide compensation, and informed the provinces of the decision in a letter from Minister of Health Rona Ambrose. Because the changes apply only to new drugs, it is not expected that the price increases will occur until 2025 or so.
Cheese
CETA raises the import quota on cheese from the EU from roughly 13,500 tons to roughly 31,000
tons. According to the agreement, this will occur gradually, over the course of six years. Two fears are related to this provision, which presumably was offered in exchange for increased EU import quotas on Canadian beef and pork. One is that the increased inflow of EU cheese will threaten the burgeoning group of artisanal Canadian cheesemakers. But perhaps the greater fear is that the provision is a sign that the long-standing Canadian supply management system that regulates the production of milk, eggs and poultry might be reformed in future trade negotiations.
The first fear seems unfounded. Domestic consumption of cheese is about 405,000 tons, of which 380,000 tons is domestically produced (Agriweek 2013) , so the increase in the EU quota does not seem catastrophic. Because the increased imports are likely to be in the high-end cheese market, however, they might have a greater impact on Canadian producers of these cheeses, but even though the Europeans have a long history of producing fine cheeses, not everyone believes they will displace their Canadian competitors. For example, Afrim Pristine, a cheese retailer interviewed by the Toronto Star, said he thought Canadian producers could withstand the new competition: "I've seen the evolution of the cheese industry in Canada. I'm blown away by Canadian product. I don't see this as a threat" (Flavelle 2013) . Nonetheless, the federal government has promised to "monitor impact and, if needed, provide compensation This prediction of a "larger hit" to the dairy sector in the TPP negotiations was realized when the scope of the TPP agreement was announced in October 2015.
Recent developments in the TPP
As part of the TPP, and in return for concessions made by other countries, Canada granted its TPP partners greater market access to supply-managed products and will gradually reduce tariffs on automobiles and associated parts from TPP countries. Canada also committed to lower the proportion of the value of automobiles and parts that must come from its TPP partners in order for those goods to enter Canada duty free. Recognizing the harm that these concessions might cause to workers and firms in those sectors, the federal government promised to create two new sector-specific TAA programs. Whether the new Liberal government will implement these programs (or, indeed, those promised as part of CETA) remains unclear.
First, a $2.4-billion income guarantee program for producers in the supply-managed sectors -the dairy, chicken, turkey, egg and hatching egg industries -was promised to ensure that their incomes do not fall for at least 10 years after the TPP comes into force. Because producers own "quotas" whose value could decline as a result of the agreement, the $1.5-billion quota value guarantee program will insure them against declines in quota value over the next decade. Finally, the government has promised a $450-million processor modernization fund for processors in the supply-managed sector, aiming to support new investment by firms as well as expenditures related to technical and management capacity. Overall, the support promised to the supply-managed sector is worth $4.3 billion. 30 Even though it will be spread across 10 to 15 years, this amount is still very large compared with the annual budgets of TAA programs in the US (US$600 million for all trade-affected workers) and EU (about US$200 million).
Second, for the auto sector, the Conservative Party promised to provide de facto adjustment assistance by expanding and renewing the Automobile Innovation Fund that provides loans to Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance? firms in the auto sector. These loans can be transformed into grants if the investments create jobs. The Conservatives promised to renew the fund, set to expire in fiscal year 2017-18, and to increase its funding by $1 billion over the next ten years.
Summary
The commitments to provide adjustment assistance make CETA and the TPP unique among recent FTAs. To our knowledge, no similar commitments have been made in other recent FTAs or in those under negotiation. Interestingly, regarding CETA-related compensation, our interviewees thought that the three cases of compensation had emerged in very different ways.
Compensation to provinces for higher drug costs was discussed at the outset of the CETA ne- In all three cases, the federal government committed to assistance primarily for political reasons: when it needed support and could not find another solution, it offered compensation.
Our interviewees felt that the key reason assistance was offered was that, in CETA, it was imperative that the federal government enlist the cooperation of the provinces, and compensation was the appropriate tool to use in some cases. Whether the assistance made economic sense was not a major consideration. In other words, TAA programs in the form that emerged in the 1960s
(and still exist in the United States) are not in the cards. The limited nature of the programs announced in the wake of the TPP agreement provides further support for these points.
For the purposes of our key research question in this study -does Canada need TAA? -we conclude that there is no political rationale for a broad-based permanent TAA program. The federal government can use TAA-like measures on an as-needed basis to reach a consensus with provinces or sectors in a narrow range of sensitive areas. Thus the only reason Canada might need a TAA program would be for its economic role -if such a program can enhance efficiency or provide compensation.
The Magnitude of Adjustment Costs in Canada W hether Canada might need to reintroduce a TAA program for economic reasons, such as to enhance efficiency or to provide compensation, depends in part on the magnitude of adjustment costs that FTAs and, more generally, increased competition impose on Canadian workers and firms. And although the size of these costs matters, so too does their distributioncosts concentrated on specific groups of workers or regions would be a greater concern than costs spread more widely.
Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance?
It seems likely that, over the medium term, FTAs, including CETA and TPP, will have only modest effects on the Canadian economy, and thus the resulting adjustment costs likely will be small. One reason is that Canada has already experienced substantial trade liberalization through a series of previous FTAs -notably the Canada-US FTA and NAFTA -and multilateral trade agreements within the GATT and the World Trade Organization. 31 Canada's NAFTA partners, the United States and Mexico, account for 77 percent of its exports and 58 percent of its imports. Another reason is that trade agreement provisions related to sensitive products or areas are almost always implemented gradually. For example, in CETA, Canada has agreed to eliminate protection of some products, but only over the course of 7 years; in the Canada-South Korea FTA, some provisions will be phased in over 11 years.
Simulations of the effects of future FTAs conducted by DFATD, often in collaboration with its foreign counterparts, suggest that the long-run gains of any such agreements would be modest relative to the size of Canadian economy. Even when the gains seem to be large, such as the roughly 0.8 percent increase in Canada's gross domestic product that CETA might bring, they would be dispersed by the gradual implementation and adjustment of any trade deal over a long period (see table 1 ).
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Overall, we have little reason to believe that Canada faces a serious challenge of adjusting to FTAs. Nonetheless, there are concerns that adjustment costs might be relatively high in some specific sectors. In particular, any significant liberalization of supply-managed sectors would create important costs. Eliminating protection could lead to a large inflow of imports that would hurt Canadian producers and workers in those sectors. Still, if Canada were to stay on the path of partial and gradual liberalization along with ad hoc government aid, the challenge of adjustment in these sectors likely would be modest.
Another important sector about which FTAs have raised concerns is the auto sector. In particular, in the Canada-South Korea FTA, Canada has agreed to eliminate its 6.1 percent tariff on imported South Korean passenger vehicles. There is no consensus on the impact this might have, but Ciuriak, Xiao and Dadkhah (2015) suggest that the Canadian auto sector's output might decline by only 0.05 percent even if a relatively large expansion of South Korean imports Canada (2014) . 1 Interpreting these estimates is not straightforward. They are obtained within general equilibrium models by comparing the value of GDP in the preliberalization equilibrium of the economy, which is described by baseline data, to the value of GDP in the postliberalization equilibrium of the economy. The estimates show the percentage change by which the value of annual preliberalization GDP will increase if the agreement is implemented and all subsequent adjustments take place, holding all else constant. Details can be found in the studies. 2 The Indian counterpart of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development conducted an analysis showing that the potential increase in Canada's GDP resulting from a Canada-India agreement might be about 1 percent. Its analysis, however, allowed for an arbitrary increase in productivity that was assumed to accompany the implementation of the hypothetical trade agreement. Although a change in productivity is a reasonable assumption, it makes the estimate of the increase in GDP hard to compare with other estimates presented in the table.
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were to occur, mainly because South Korea would gain a market share in Canada mostly at the expense of US and Japanese imports into Canada. Moreover, as the agreement is expected to result in income growth in Canada, it would also increase the demand for cars in Canada, thus lessening the negative effect of the FTA still further. Other views on the potential effect of the agreement, however, are not so sanguine. Stanford (2014) , for example, argues that, since one of the Canadian auto sector's most important features is that all assembly plants in Canada are controlled by multinational corporations, an incremental decline in the sector caused by FTAs with the EU, South Korea and Japan might undermine decisions by these corporations to invest in their Canadian facilities. As noted in the previous section, Canada also made important auto sector concessions as part of the TPP agreement. It is too early to gauge the impact of those concessions, but they raise similar concerns.
Although the Canadian economy is not likely to experience significant adjustment costs as the result of any particular FTA (apart from some uncertainty regarding adjustment in relatively sensitive sectors noted above), adjustment remains a concern nevertheless. Bown and McCulloch (2007) argue that, in the current environment of trade liberalization, adjustment to global competition will be a continuing challenge. In such an environment, adjustment processes are not necessarily linked to specific trade agreements, but instead are set in motion by a variety of global factors -such as the remarkable growth of manufacturing production in China and sharp exchange-rate fluctuations -that affect the level of competition in the domestic market and the competitiveness of Canadian producers in international markets.
There is a dearth of recent studies that use Canadian data to explore the effect of import competition on workers' displacement, but US studies focusing on the manufacturing sector (for example, Revenga 1992) generally illustrate its adverse effects. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) show that 14 percent of aggregate job losses in the US manufacturing sector over the period from 1977 to 1997 were due to competition with imports from low-wage countries, although the authors caution that their work does not take into account the efficiency gains that import competition might have facilitated in some industries. Autor et al. (2013) examine how US imports from China affected the earnings and employment of workers in the US manufacturing sector over the 1992-2007 period. They show that workers employed in 1991 -prior to the overall increase in import competition from China -in an industry that then experienced a relatively large increase in import competition over the study period had lower earnings in that period. The negative effects are much more pronounced for low-tenure workers, low-wage workers, workers with weak attachment to the labour force and workers in large firms with low wage levels. High-wage workers, in contrast, often anticipate mass layoffs and are able to move to other jobs without a decline in their earnings prior to the layoffs. This implies that adjustment costs are likely concentrated in specific groups of lower-skilled workers.
Canadian evidence also suggests that workers who are displaced (for any reason) suffer losses in earnings even over the long term. Using Canadian data from the late 1980s and 1990s, Morissette, Zhang and Frenette (2007) show that, even after five years, the earnings of workers who were laid off because of firm closures or as part of mass layoffs did not reach their predisplacement levels. Depending on the model specification and samples, earnings of displaced male Does Canada Need Trade Adjustment Assistance? workers were reduced between 9 percent and 22 percent five years after displacement, and for female workers, the corresponding numbers were between 12 percent and 31 percent.
Future free trade agreements likely will impose only modest adjustment costs on the Canadian economy. That said, adjustment to import competition per se is probably a much greater ongoing challenge. Evidence suggests that import competition has a negative effect on the employment and earnings of workers and that it is concentrated in particular groups of workers.
Import competition, though, is just one aspect of an ongoing globalization that connects national economies in various ways and exposes them to risks related to shifts or cyclical fluctuations in the world economy. commission acknowledged the need for labour adjustment policy to compensate workers for losses and to mitigate political pressure against freer trade. To that end, it proposed a package of reforms of both labour market and income-security programs. The most important elements of the package were reforms to unemployment insurance to give unemployed workers a stronger incentive to seek new work, and the introduction of a Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program (TAAP) to provide training and relocation assistance to workers willing to "undertake adaptive behaviour," as well as preretirement benefits to workers who could not adjust.
The commission's more comprehensive set of labour market programs did not emerge. And, over the years, the major Canadian unemployment insurance program, now called employment insurance (EI), has become weaker, rather than stronger. A report by the Mowat Centre Employment
Insurance Task Force (2011, 4) notes that, "if a new federal support system for the unemployed were designed from scratch today, it would look substantially different from the current EI program…The program is no longer consistent with the objectives of a modern income support program for the unemployed. Overall, the system's design cannot be defended on a principled basis." Driven both by changes in the labour market -more self-employment, more short-term jobs -and by changes in EI rules, the proportion of the unemployed who receive EI benefits has dropped from about 80 percent when Macdonald Commission did its analysis to less than 50 percent today. Moreover, EI is designed to deal with workers who face frictional or cyclical unemployment and who therefore can be assumed to be able to find new employment. It is not well designed for those made redundant by structural changes that harm long-established industries and who cannot reasonably be expected to find new employment quickly.
Not surprisingly, others have called for a wider set of labour market adjustment programs than currently exists. From a trade policy perspective, Richardson (2010) calls for structural adjustment assistance in the United States. He argues that global integration is happening along many lines -trade, technology, business organization, supply chains -and it is therefore not reasonable to try to isolate trade from other forms of integration. There is thus a need to reshape traditional trade adjustment assistance into structural adjustment assistance that "would recognize the many ways that globally enabled dynamism exposes workers to the same instability and displacement as does trade -even when such dynamism seems more narrowly conceived as technological and organizational innovation" (345). In Richardson's view, the principal objectives would be to enable workers "to prosper from inter-linked global opportunity and technological dynamism" and "to manage their risks and challenges more effectively" (346). From a similar perspective, Rosen (2008) calls for a national strategy for responding to economic dislocation in the United States that would serve as an umbrella for state-specific unemployment insurance programs and a set of existing ad hoc programs.
Conclusion
Canada is undergoing a period of intense trade liberalization, having recently agreed to a com- The recently concluded negotiations with the EU on CETA led the federal government to promise to help three different sectors -fish, pharmaceuticals and cheese -adjust to the new agreement. The CETA negotiations were distinct from previous negotiations because of the more important role provincial negotiators played -a role made necessary by the EU's desire to deal with issues under provincial jurisdiction. Because the aid the federal government promised effectively acted as a form of trade adjustment assistance, we interviewed several provincial negotiators to see how they understood the offers of assistance. We took from those interviews the impression that the federal aid was an ad hoc effort to enlist the cooperation of all provinces when some conflict seemed likely.
The compensation offered thus far in the wake of the TPP agreement is similar in spirit to that offered in CETA and suffers from a similar defect. The ad hoc nature of the programs in both CETA and the TPP implies quite different and potentially inequitable treatment of firms and workers, depending on the sector in which they operate. Compare, for example, the funds promised to dairy and poultry processors in the TPP to those offered (but as yet not delivered) to
Newfoundland and Labrador fish processors in the CETA negotiations. As far as we now know, there are no conditions attached to the $450-million Processor Modernization Fund being established for dairy and poultry processors. The story of the Newfoundland Fish Fund, however, is quite different. In that case, the federal government promised in 2013 to contribute up to $280 million to a fund for the fishing industry. Later, however, the government abandoned that promise, and instead claimed that contributions to the fund would be based on "demonstrable harm" arising from the CETA agreement.
The $4.3-billion supply management program offered in connection to the TPP and CETA might be seen as inequitable in another way. According to the 2011 Farm Financial Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, the average net worth of a Canadian dairy farmer was $2.7 million, with average annual net cash farm income of over $120,000. Many workers outside the supply-managed sectors might be negatively affected by the TPP and CETA agreements, but they will receive no income guarantee. Instead, they will have only the EI system to fall back on, a system that has been weakened in past decades and never had the capacity to deal with structural adjustment.
The supply management program offered in connection with the TPP, while similar in its ad hoc nature and potential inequity, is quite different in one respect. Unlike any prior program, the supply management Income Guarantee Program has taken a "preliberalization" view of assistance, guaranteeing that those affected will have incomes equal to those they had prior to the agreement.
Finally, there should be concern about the economic effectiveness of the assistance programs.
In the auto sector, the history of TAA programs in Canada (as well as in the United States and South Korea) suggests that government-provided loans are not an effective way to help firms adjust. For example, the United States abandoned this form of assistance in the 1980s, apparently because evaluations showed their ineffectiveness. Apart from being a generous compensation package, assistance to the supply-managed sectors is similarly unlikely to be effective in maintaining the viability of those sectors. The programs effectively stifle incentives for the sector to change. And even though the Modernization Fund could help processors become more efficient, the continued regulation of supply and prices in the sector may result in ineffective use of the funds. In similar US and South Korean programs, firms used the funds for purposes other than "modernization."
In the end, we believe that there is no need for a separate trade adjustment assistance program in Canada in its traditional forms, because ➤ the effectiveness of TAA as an adjustment mechanism is in doubt;
➤ the scale of any negative adjustment costs caused by new trade agreements is likely to be relatively modest for the Canadian economy;
➤ the TAA-like compensation that was part of the CETA and TPP negotiations seems to have facilitated a political consensus in the absence of a formal TAA program; and ➤ it would be extremely difficult to determine who should be eligible for such assistance, so that any TAA program ultimately would result in somewhat arbitrary and uneven support for specific groups of displaced workers.
Nonetheless, we think that a more modern, stronger set of labour adjustment programs is long overdue. The goal of these programs should be to aid all workers permanently damaged by structural changes in the increasingly integrated global economy, whether those changes are caused by trade agreements or by other factors such as broad technological change or strong economic growth in emerging economies. Better labour market policies to facilitate workers' adjustment to these changes would lessen the need for politically motivated, ad hoc compensation measures such as occurred around the CETA negotiations and the TPP. This ultimately would contribute to a more transparent and fairer way to achieve political consensus in Canada for trade agreements. The exact design of these policies, however, remains an important issue for policy-makers and a promising avenue for future research.
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assignment, it is possible that the comparison group members differed systematically from the TAA-participant groups in unobserved ways. Most important, workers must apply to participate in TAA, even if they are eligible, and they must decide whether to participate by exhausting their unemployment insurance benefits or by starting TAA-funded training. Recognizing the potential for such self-selection into the program, Schochet et al. estimate effects using a variety of approaches. Here, we report only the effect the authors designate as "preferred."
12 Workers were covered by a certified petition if they were laid off at any time between a year before a petition was filed for them and two years after the petition was certified by the US Employment and Training Administration.
13 Under the 2011 legislation, training funds were almost doubled, up to US$534.4 million in 2013. With about 40,000 people in training in that year, that implied an average training expenditure of over US$13,000 per trainee. Several changes were introduced that made requirements for participation in training more flexible, such as allowing part-time participation, and income support of trainees was extended for a longer period.
14 An analysis of whether that political context is stable and still persists in the United States goes beyond the scope of this study.
15 Originally, in 1960s, eligibility was restrictive. For a firm to qualify, it had to be shown, first, that imports hurt the firm (Cyr 2009 ) and, second, that imports were a result "in major part" of trade concessions made by government in trade agreements (United States 1987) . Under the most recent version of the program, the eligibility criteria are far less restrictive.
16 We thank our research assistant, Yi-Hyun Ryu, for summarizing the available Korean-language sources.
17 From an email message sent by Heo to our research assistant.
18 For more information, see the English site of the South Korean organization, Small and Medium Business Corporation (http://home.sbc.or.kr/sbc/eng/index.jsp).
19 We focus on the CETA negotiations in this section because it seems that provincial participation in them was markedly more extensive than in the TPP negotiations.
20 In that case, Parliament had passed legislation that would have implemented an agreement that Canada had made as a member of the International Labour Organization. The Supreme Court of Canada was evenly split on the issue of whether Parliament had the authority to impose legislation in areas (such as labour relations) that were constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the provinces, and the case was therefore referred to the British Privy Council, then the last court of appeal. The Privy Council ruled that Parliament did not have the authority to impose such regulations (Cyr 2009 ).
21 See, for example, Fafard and Leblond (2012) , Kukucha (2013) and Paquin (2013) . This section is based on our interviews with provincial trade negotiators.
22 And, as one interviewee pointed out, the quality and reliability of the daily briefings were enhanced because the briefings had to be factual if some members of the audience actually heard what went on.
Notes
We thank Stephen Tapp for helpful comments and suggestions. 4 The current premier, Kathleen Wynne, has said that Ontario would support CETA but "we want some more and clearer assurance that we're going to get some compensation" (Benzie 2013).
5 Under tariff rate quotas, imports below a predetermined level are subject to low tariffs, and imports above the predetermined level are subject to much higher tariffs; see Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (2013b) .
6 Our adjustment for inflation depends on whether we adjust for a difference in prices between today and the beginning of the program (1982) or the end of the program (1990). Ranges for cost estimates below are provided for the same reason.
7 "General Accounting Office" is the former name of what is now the Government Accountability Office; the name was changed in 2004. We use the abbreviation GAO to refer to both the previous name and the new one.
8 In June 2015, House Democrats, who generally support trade adjustment assistance, nonetheless voted against it when it was packaged together with the trade promotion authority (TPA). Once the two elements were unbundled, however, and TAA proposed in a different bill, both TAA and TPA passed Congress and were signed into law by President Obama on June 29, 2015 . See United States (2015 and FXStreet (2015) .
9 The authors point out that these disappointing results might reflect not only the nature of the training, but also a number of methodological issues in the studies. Based on his own literature review, Jones (2011) reaches a similar conclusion about the mixed effect of training.
10 Creating a counterfactual through random assignment to the TAA program or to a control group was not feasible because the TAA program was an entitlement and could not be denied to the control group.
11 Propensity score matching was used to choose a comparison group that was as close as possible to the TAA participants on an extensive list of observed characteristics. Absent random 27 The letters are available on the website of the Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly: http://www.assembly.nl.ca/ business/electronicdocuments/Canada-EUComprehensive EconomicTradeAgreement-CETA.pdf.
28 For further discussion of these issues, see Schwartz (2014) .
29 The rationale for the expansion of intellectual property rights for patent drug manufacturers has been questioned; see Lexchin and Gagnon (2014) and Hollis and Grootendorst (2012) .
30 It appears that the assistance to cheesemakers offered in CETA will be delivered through these TPP programs (Canada 2015b) .
31 Liberalization of trade with the United States through the Canada-US FTA of 1989 and subsequently NAFTA was a major shock to the Canadian economy. Trefler (2004) shows that, although the 1989 agreement had a large positive impact on productivity in Canadian manufacturing and apparently increased Canadian welfare, the cost of those gains was high: 100,000 jobs lost in the manufacturing sector (5 percent of all jobs in the sector), mostly concentrated in import-competing industries. Morissette, Qiu and Chan (2013) report that between 7.0 and 9.2 percent of manufacturing workers were laid off permanently (for any reason) in each year over the period from 1989 to 1996. This suggests that job losses from the FTA were commensurate with at least 50 percent of annual net job losses in the sector.
32 We note three things here. First, DFATD's simulations can shed some light on the potential effects of FTAs, but this tool only partially captures such effects. One important shortcoming is that the model can analyze only trade in products that are currently traded -that is, it does not take into account the possibility that countries will start trading in new products. Nor does the model capture the effects of liberalization and cooperation in areas other than trade in goods and services -notably, foreign investment. The model also has to make simplifying assumptions about the removal of barriers to trade in services because of the complex nature of such trade and the lack of data. Generally, as Ciuriak and Chen (2008) note, such modelling exercises are sensitive to some underlying assumptions, so that any such assessments of potential effects should be viewed with caution. Second, liberalization scenarios assumed in the studies also include assumptions regarding the elimination of barriers to trade in services. Third, the 0.8 percent estimate of the impact of CETA on Canada's gross domestic product should treated with caution. That estimate was made as part of a joint study by Canada and the EU released in 2008, prior to the outset of the CETA negotiations. The quantitative modelling was based on assumptions about the future provisions of the agreement. In particular, it was assumed that CETA would entirely eliminate tariffs on all goods, including sensitive goods. The current agreement is less ambitious, with protection of some products being liberalized only partially and gradually and other sensitive products exempt from tariff elimination.
33 Our conclusion that Canada does not need TAA is based on the country's current economic and political situation. The politics of federal-provincial relations might change rapidly in the context of other large trade agreements such as the TPP or in response to other developments, such as in the fish fund dispute between the federal government and Newfoundland and Labrador, causing generally cooperative federal-provincial relations in trade policy to vanish. Furthermore, the actual economic effects of recent FTAs are not known, and may differ from ex ante assessments. If the effects prove to be larger than anticipated or if the politics around FTAs change, a new economic or political rationale for trade adjustment assistance might emerge. We thank Patrick Fafard for helping us recognize this point.
